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FAVORITISM AND REFEREE BIAS IN EUROPEAN SOCCER: EVIDENCE
FROM THE SPANISH LEAGUE AND THE UEFA CHAMPIONS LEAGUE
BABATUNDE BURAIMO, ROB SIMMONS and MAREK MACIASZCZYK
In this paper, we test for, and find evidence of, referee bias in favor of home teams
in European football using minute-by-minute analysis to control for within-game
events. The context for the analysis is Spain’s Primera Liga and the Union of
European Football Association (UEFA) Champions League. We find that the award of
sanctions by Spanish referees in the Champions League are not significantly different
to those of the referees from other countries and as such are subject to the same
sources of bias. In Primera Liga matches where the crowd is separated from the pitch
by running tracks, we find that the probability of the award of a yellow card to the
home team is higher and that of the away team is lower compared to matches played
at stadia without running tracks. Similar results are found in the Champions League,
where efforts are made to hire “neutral” referees. Referee behavior is also influenced
by the size of the crowd in attendance. (JEL D8, J2)
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing literature has highlighted the pos-
sibility of favorable treatment of some agents
offered by principals. Such behavior can lead to
inefficiency in principal-agent relationships and
hence inefficiency in particular labor markets.
If agents’ performances in workplaces are sub-
jectively assessed then key decisions on worker
careers, such as promotions, may be biased in
such a way that the most productive work-
ers may not be optimally allocated to their
best jobs and assignments within organizations.
This problem has been analyzed theoretically by
Prendergast (1999).
Although the theory of favoritism in
principal-agent relationships is well established,
testing for both the presence of favoritism and
for unintended adverse effects on organizational
performance is very difficult in most labor
markets as the required data are simply not
available. Questionnaires are unlikely to elicit
honest and reliable responses to questions about
favoritism. Assessing worker performance in
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many organizations, particularly in the service
sector, is fraught with difficulties because of
complexities of team production.
Hence, many researchers have turned to pro-
fessional team sports as a vehicle for analyz-
ing favoritism and its effects on organizations.
Team sports offer precise, detailed, and publicly
available performance data for both players and
teams. In this paper, we investigate favoritism as
applied by soccer referees in response to social
pressure applied by crowds inside stadia. Soc-
cer authorities are aware of the possibilities of
bias when soccer referees make judgements dur-
ing matches and these referees are trained to
avoid such bias. In one of the competitions that
we shall analyze, the pan-European Union of
European Football Association (UEFA) Cham-
pions League, the organizers appoint neutral
match officials from outside the countries rep-
resented by the teams in any match. We shall
show that referee bias persists even in this case.
In our second case, the Spanish Primera Liga,
we also find evidence of referee bias. This case
comprises teams that vary considerably in size
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and also have to travel long distances to games
in a large country.
We aim to assess bias by referees in the form
of awards of sanctions against players who are
penalized for infractions against the rules of pro-
fessional soccer. These rules are set by the world
governing body of soccer, Fe´de´ration Interna-
tionale de Football Association (FIFA), and not
by competition organizers. The role of soccer
referees is to ensure that players perform within
the rules of soccer and, when rules are broken,
that players are sanctioned appropriately. Sanc-
tions vary from free kicks against the offending
team to yellow cards (“cautions”) to the ulti-
mate sanction of a red card, denoting expulsion
from the game without replacement. Two yel-
low cards awarded to a player in a match results
in automatic expulsion and so can be seen as
equivalent to a red card.
In team sports worldwide, referees and
umpires are employed to make critical judge-
ments about player behavior that could have
consequences for game outcomes. In baseball,
umpires decide whether a pitcher’s ball is in a
“strike zone” defined as an area within which
a batter has the potential to hit the ball. In
basketball, referees assess whether fouls are
committed. In each of these sports, investiga-
tors have detected racial bias. In Major League
Baseball, pitchers with same race or ethnicity
as the umpires give up fewer hits, strike out
more batters, and improve their teams’ prob-
ability of winning (Parsons et al. 2011). In
the National Basketball Association, it appears
that more personal fouls are called against
players when the refereeing crew is opposite-
race rather than own-race (Price and Wolfers
2010).
In Spanish soccer, Garicano, Palacios-Huerta,
and Prendergast (2005) found that referees
added more discretionary “injury time” at the
end of normal time when home teams were
behind in score compared to when home teams
were ahead in score. This suggests a form
of home team bias by referees. But although
Rickman and Witt (2008) found a similar type
of bias for English Premier League soccer, this
bias disappeared with the onset of annual salary
contracts for referees, which the authors term
“professionalism.” The wider implication is that
bias can be removed by appropriate financial
incentives.
Although the studies of “injury time bias”
are persuasive, with credible econometric mod-
eling, the ability of teams to score in time
added on at the end of a match would appear
to be rather limited. An alternative form of
bias can be sought in the form of sanctions
(cards) given to players during matches. The
award of a caution (yellow card) implies that
a player’s aggression, which could be physical
or verbal, needs to be curbed, otherwise a sec-
ond yellow card and a dismissal will follow.
Ridder, Cramer, and Hopstaken (1994) have
shown that teams reduced from 11 to 10 play-
ers because of a dismissal will tend to lose
games played against teams with a full com-
plement of players. Players and fans know this,
of course. This is why players surround soccer
referees, and fans shout, to encourage referees
to award cards to opponents after fouls or other
misdemeanors.
A growing literature has detected favorable
treatment to home teams in the award of cards.
Dawson et al. (2007) analyzed a large sam-
ple of English Premier League games over the
period 1996–2003 and controlled for referee
fixed effects and a number of covariates reflect-
ing relative strength. The conclusion emerged
that away teams received more cautions and
sendings off than home teams, even after con-
ditioning for home advantage effects on match
results. In a sequel, Dawson and Dobson (2010)
consider referee bias in the UEFA Champions
League and the UEFA Cup. Again controlling
for relative strengths and game characteristics
they find that home teams receive less sanctions
than away teams.
A potential problem with the studies by Daw-
son and co-authors is that they do not consider
within-game dynamics, particularly the progress
of score during the game and likely responses
by teams. As Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons
(2010) show, teams that are behind in score,
which are most likely to be away teams, tend to
adopt more aggressive behavior that incurs more
cautions. A complete analysis of referee bias
should then control for events during the game
that might cause referees to award more cards,
without necessarily being associated with bias
to any particular type of team. Buraimo, For-
rest, and Simmons find evidence of bias toward
home teams by referees in both English Pre-
mier League and German Bundesliga 1, after
controlling for a number of pregame and within-
game characteristics as well as referee fixed
effects. In particular, referee bias can be iden-
tified by the removal of running tracks around
stadia in Germany. When tracks were removed,
or teams relocated to stadia without tracks, it
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was found that home teams received fewer yel-
low and red cards than when tracks were in
place. The authors interpret the removal of run-
ning tracks as leading to an increase in social
pressure which might in turn affect referee
behavior.
The present paper uses the same methodol-
ogy of within-game analysis to consider two
important soccer competitions: Spain’s Primera
Liga and UEFA’s Champions League. The
Spanish case is notable for its League struc-
ture where three large teams (Real Madrid,
Barcelona, and Valencia) are dominant. This is
a League in which some very small teams com-
pete with some very large teams. Also, Spain has
large distances between some locations mean-
ing that the composition of attendance will be
more skewed toward home fans than in England,
where distances between teams are relatively
small.
UEFA’s Champions League is of interest
because UEFA makes a conscious decision to
appoint neutral match officials who are not
from countries of competing teams in any given
match. This is a deliberate attempt to combat
potential bias. But this attempt to remove bias
may still be unsuccessful if neutral referees are
still susceptible to social pressure and if referee
behavior is inconsistent across national identities
(Dawson and Dobson 2010).
II. METHODOLOGY
To test for home advantage and refereeing
bias, matches from Spain’s Primera Liga and
the UEFA Champions League from 2003–2004
to 2006–2007 are used. Referees in the Primera
Liga are drawn from a list of match officials
nominated by the Spanish Football Association.
In contrast, UEFA deliberately ensures that ref-
erees and their assistants are taken from coun-
tries outside of those containing the contestants
in a given Champions League match. That is,
UEFA attempts to install “neutral” referees, pre-
cisely because of the risk that referees from a
country that one or both teams belong to may
be prone to implicit bias. If this hiring policy is
fully successful, then we expect any referee bias
observed in domestic competitions to disappear
in the Champions League.
Most studies on referees’ behavior have
used match as the unit of observation (e.g.,
see Boyko, Boyko, and Boyko 2007; Dawson
et al. 2007; Dawson and Dobson 2010; Scoppa,
2007). Assessing refereeing sanctions using
match as the unit of observation is imprecise.
Although some factors do not vary across indi-
vidual matches, a significant proportion of sanc-
tions are likely to depend on events that occur
during the match itself. For this reason, analyses
should take account of events that occur dur-
ing the match. Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons’s
(2010) study of refereeing bias in English and
German football is a precursor in this respect.
They use minute as the unit of observation
and incorporate within-game information. Simi-
larly, we assess the probability of a card being
awarded to either team in any given minute
using a bivariate probit model. The use of
minute as the unit of observation is relatively
new in the analysis of games (Buraimo, For-
rest, and Simmons 2010; Corral, Rodriguez, and
Simmons 2010) but a very appropriate unit of
analysis. By using minute as the unit of obser-
vation, the precise order and effects of events
occurring during a match can be taken into
account. For example, two matches may report
the same number of cards and goals; however,
in one match, the goals may have preceded the
cards and even contributed to the cards. In the
other, the cards may have preceded the goals;
however, using match as the unit of observa-
tion would not sufficiently deal with the order of
events as they occur during a match. This means
that each of the 90 minutes across 1,520 games
in the Primera Liga form the basis of the anal-
ysis. This also applies in the case of the UEFA
Champions League, however, for a small num-
ber of matches in this league, the matches have
cause to extend beyond the normal 90 minutes
of play and an additional 30 minutes are played.
These are normally during the second leg of the
knockout stage in which the outcome is limited
to either a home or away win; draws are not
permitted as one team must progress to the next
stage.
A bivariate probit model fits maximum-
likelihood for two probit models. The conjecture
in using a bivariate probit model is that the error
terms from the two probit estimates are cor-
related. In the case of independence, the two
equations reduce to two univariate probit mod-
els. If the error terms are correlated, the use of a
bivariate probit model produces efficient param-
eter estimates of the independent variables. For
a more formal presentation of the model, see
Greene (2008). The application of the bivari-
ate probit model is appropriate on theoretical
as well as empirical grounds. First, the award
of sanctions to either team is not independent
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of those awarded to or events involving the
opposing team. Furthermore, the null hypoth-
esis that the correlation between the two error
terms is 0 is rejected in all cases. Hence
the probabilities of sanctions should be jointly
modeled (see Buraimo, Forrest, and Simmons
2010; Dawson et al. 2007; Dawson and Dobson
2010).
For both competitions, the dependent vari-
ables are pairs of binary indicators. The first
pair represents the award of yellow cards to
home and away teams in any given minute of
the match. These variables take the value of 1 if
a card is awarded during that minute or 0 other-
wise. A second pair of variables is constructed
but this time for dismissals. For dismissals, no
distinction is made between the award of a sec-
ond yellow card and a straight red. Preliminary
analysis showed that there was very little dis-
tinction between models of second yellow and
straight red cards. Furthermore, combining sec-
ond yellow and red cards is justifiable given that
they result in the same outcome, a player being
sent off.
A. Pregame Variables
To model the dependent variables, two groups
of variables are noted: pregame and within-
game. Pregame information is based on data
available prior to the start of the game and
remains constant throughout the match. The first
of these is track. In Spain, it is common for
games to be played on pitches surrounded by
running tracks. Dohmen’s (2008) analysis of
German football found that the presence of a
running track influenced the amount of extra
time that referees allocated at the end of the sec-
ond half. Track is a binary variable that takes the
value of 1 if a track is present and 0 otherwise.
As noted in the previous section, crowd pres-
sure is a significant part of the literature. The
conjecture is that the greater the crowd size, the
more likely decisions will favor home teams.
The extent of favoritism shown to the home
team is likely to depend on crowd composi-
tion. The crowd may not be entirely made up
of home team fans and a significant portion
may be neutral or fans of the opposing team. In
the absence of information on crowd composi-
tion, crowd size is a reasonable proxy for home
support. To capture the influence of support
and crowd pressure, log attendance, the log of
match attendance, is included as an independent
variable.
Matches that involve local rivals (e.g., Real
Madrid and Athletico Madrid) or are of his-
torical significance (e.g., Real Madrid and FC
Barcelona) may induce greater levels of foul
play. These matches carry greater importance
beyond league standings as rival fans seek to
gain bragging rights over their counterparts.
Consequently, additional pressure exerted by
fans may induce extra effort on the part of
players which may spill over into foul play
punishable by a caution or a dismissal. A
dummy variable derby takes the value of 1 if
the match involves such rivalry and 0 other-
wise. For the Champions League, derby takes
the value of 1 if both teams are from the same
country, otherwise its value is set to 0.
The award of sanctions will vary depending
on the relative qualities of the teams. If one team
is significantly superior to its rival, the incentive
for its players to engage in foul play is reduced
as the team is expected to outplay its oppo-
nent. The less favored team, however, stands to
benefit from foul play as it looks to stifle the
opponent. To capture team quality, we use odds
taken from the betting market. The abolition of
tax on betting and increased competition in the
betting market mean that bookmakers have to set
odds that are both competitive and an accurate
reflection of the likely outcome of events (see
Forrest, Goddard, and Simmons 2005). Using
odds data from William Hill, the probabilities of
a home win, away win, and draw are computed
by taking the reciprocal of the published returns
to a unit stake. The sum of the three probabili-
ties normally exceeds 1 because of the inbuilt
over-round reflecting the bookmaker’s profits.
The three probabilities are adjusted by divid-
ing by the over-round so that they sum to 1.
To capture the expected closeness of the game,
the difference in home and away win probabili-
ties (difference in bookmaker probability), along
with its square are included. As the difference
increases emphasizing the home team’s superior
quality, the likelihood of the home team being
awarded a card is expected to reduce. For the
away team, the likelihood of a card is expected
to increase at a decreasing rate. One would
expect that as the home team’s quality increases
relative to the away team’s quality, the bene-
fits that accrue to the away team from foul play
diminish.
As the format of the Champions League is
different to domestic leagues, additional control
variables are included to reflect this. The refer-
ence stage is the last 16 and dummy variables
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for the main group stage, as well as the quarter-
and semifinals are included and denoted by
group stage, quarterfinal, and semifinal, respec-
tively. The stages of the tournament are likely
to reflect the propensity for teams to engage
in foul play punishable by a sanction. The
finals of the Champions League are omitted
as these are played at neutral stadia. Addi-
tionally, dummy variables are also included to
capture group stage matches in which either
team has already qualified for the knockout
stages (home team qualified from group stage
and away team qualified from group stage).
Players of such teams are less likely to engage
in behavior that will result in a sanction. Finally,
dummy variables for home teams, away teams,
referees, and seasons are included as control
variables.
B. Within-Game Variables
The main characteristic of the within-game
variables is that they vary throughout the game.
Minute and its square are included as control
variables. We hypothesize that the probability of
receiving a card will increase with minute but at
a decreasing rate. In addition, dummy variables
45th minute and 90th minute are included and
take the value of 1 if the match is in the 45th
or 90th minute. Our sources of information on
times does not provide details of extra time
allocated and all events occurring in injury time
are denoted as having taken place in the last
minute of each half. The 45th and 90th are
therefore longer minutes.
Goal difference, the difference in home and
away team goals prior to current minute, along
with its squared term, is included to capture
the current state of the game. The behaviors of
players and referees are likely to be influenced
by this. As the difference in home and away
goals increases, the incentives and benefits from
committing fouls are reduced.
The probability of a card being issued to
either team is likely to depend on the number
of cards awarded so far. A pair of variables,
home yellow last 3 min and away yellow last
3 min, reflects the number of yellow cards
awarded recently, in the last 3 minutes prior
to the current minute. These variables, depend-
ing on the sign and significance of their coeffi-
cients may capture an even-out effect in which
referees, having recently sanctioned one team,
feel inclined to sanction the other. Alterna-
tively, it may also capture retaliation in which
players respond to being fouled by the oppo-
sition by committing fouls themselves soon
after. Complementing these are home yellow
prior and away yellow prior which are the total
number of yellow cards awarded prior to the
last 3 minutes to the home and away teams,
respectively.
The last pair of variables is home second yel-
low and red and away second yellow and red
and are the total number of second yellow and
red cards received by the home and away teams,
respectively, prior to the minute under consider-
ation. Tables 1–4 show the summary statistics
for the award of cards across the two com-
petitions along with those of the independent
variables.
Our bivariate probit model for yellow cards
in the Primera Liga is:
Pr(home yellow card, away yellow card) = f (track,
log attendance, derby, difference in bookmaker prob-
ability, difference in bookmaker probability squared,
minute, minute squared, 45th minute, 90th minute,
goal difference, goal difference squared, home yel-
low last 3 min, away yellow last 3 min, home yellow
prior, away yellow prior, home second yellow and
red, away second yellow and red).
For the Champions League, the variables:
group stage, quarterfinal, semifinal, home team
qualified from group stage, away team qualified
from group stage are included in the independent
TABLE 1
















2003–2004 2.53 2.84 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.09 380
2004–2005 2.29 2.77 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07 380
2005–2006 2.48 2.85 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.09 380
2006–2007 2.46 3.05 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.12 380
Total 2.45 2.89 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 1,520
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TABLE 2
















2003–2004 1.17 1.90 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 125
2004–2005 1.45 1.72 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 125
2005–2006 1.29 2.02 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.03 125
2006–2007 1.53 1.98 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.06 125
Total 1.35 1.90 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 500
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Primera Liga (n = 135,720)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Track 0.19 0.39 0 1
Attendance 28,973.42 18,127.63 2,500 98,200
Derby 0.06 0.24 0 1
Difference in bookmaker probability 0.18 0.25 −0.58 0.78
Home yellow last 3 min 0.08 0.28 0 4
Away yellow last 3 min 0.09 0.31 0 5
Home yellow prior 0.76 1.07 0 8
Away yellow prior 0.97 1.22 0 8
Home second yellow and red 0.04 0.20 0 3
Away second yellow and red 0.05 0.23 0 3
Goal difference 0.15 1.06 −6 5
variables. For second yellow and red cards, the
dependent variables are replaced with home sec-
ond yellow and red card and away second yellow
and red card in the Primera Liga and Champions
League models.
III. RESULTS
Starting with a descriptive analysis, we test
whether the mean number of sanctions per game
by card (yellow, second yellow, and red cards)
awarded to home and away teams are equal (see
Tables 1 and 2). The null hypothesis of equality
is rejected (p < .01) in both the Primera Liga
(n = 1,520) and the Champions League (n =
500). The fact that home teams receive fewer
sanctions compared with away teams provides
some insight into the degree of home advantage
enjoyed by hosts. However, the presence of
refereeing bias is inconclusive based on this
evidence. It could be argued that home teams
generally adopt an attacking style of play and
this induces fouls play from visiting teams.
Therefore, visiting teams may justifiably receive
a higher proportion of sanctions.
Another aspect within our comparative anal-
ysis is the behavior of referees from Spain
officiating in the Champions League compared
with those from other countries. Might it be
that Spanish referees have a propensity to offer
a higher or lower amount of cards to home
and away teams relative to their non-Spanish
counterparts? To perform this comparative anal-
ysis, a vector of mean values for home and
away yellow cards, and home and away dis-
missals for Spanish referees is compared with
that of non-Spanish referees using the paired
Hotelling’s t-squared test. The test determines
whether a set of means is equal between the two
groups. The null hypothesis of equality between
Spanish and non-Spanish referees in the Cham-
pions League cannot be rejected (t-squared =
5.01 with p = .29) suggesting that the behavior
of Spanish referees in the allocation of cards
is not significantly different to their counter-
parts. This is an interesting result in that if there
was a difference, the award of cards might be
deemed to be dependent on the referees’ coun-
tries of origin; however, in the absence of any
statistical difference, the source of any bias is
consistent amongst referees irrespective of their
countries.
Given that the behavior of Spanish referees
in the Champions League is similar to those
referees from other countries, how might the
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TABLE 4
Summary Statistics for Champions League
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Champions League group stage (n = 31,500)
Track 0.22 0.41 0 1
Attendance 39,094.55 18,086.47 4,000 98,000
Derby 0.01 0.08 0 1
Difference in bookmaker probability 0.21 0.31 −0.60 0.81
Home team qualified from group stage 0.01 0.09 0 1
Away team qualified from group stage 0.01 0.12 0 1
Goal difference 0.26 1.12 −5 7
Home yellow last 3 min 0.04 0.21 0 2
Away yellow last 3 min 0.06 0.24 0 2
Home yellow prior 0.47 0.76 0 5
Away yellow prior 0.67 0.95 0 5
Home second yellow and red 0.01 0.12 0 2
Away second yellow and red 0.04 0.20 0 2
Champions League knockout stage (n = 10,500)
Track 0.17 0.37 0 1
Attendance 50,643.08 19,718.78 15,000 98,436
Derby 0.07 0.26 0 1
Difference in bookmaker probability 0.19 0.22 −0.29 0.65
First leg goal difference −0.20 0.87 −3 3
Quarter final 0.28 0.45 0 1
Semi final 0.14 0.35 0 1
Goal difference 0.27 1.01 −3 6
Home yellow last 3 min 0.05 0.21 0 2
Away yellow last 3 min 0.07 0.25 0 2
Home yellow prior 0.52 0.83 0 6
Away yellow prior 0.75 0.96 0 6
Home second yellow and red 0.02 0.13 0 1
Away second yellow and red 0.03 0.18 0 2
behavior of Spanish referees compare across
the two competitions? Again using the paired
Hotelling’s t-squared test, this time there is a
significant difference in the allocation of cards
in the two competitions and the null hypothe-
sis being rejected (t-squared = 57.22 and p =
.00). The evidence in Tables 1 and 2 suggests
that a lower amount of cards are awarded in
the Champions League compared with Primera
Liga; however, isolating Spanish referees in this
context suggests that they allocate more cards
in their domestic league. The difference might
be explained by player behavior. In the Cham-
pions League, the costs of sanctions are higher
compared with domestic leagues. This is partic-
ularly the case in the group stages in which there
are only six games per team and more so in the
knockout phase in which the fate of teams are
decided in two matches, one at home and one
away; in the domestic team, comparative cost
can be distributed across a much larger number
of games.
A. Pregame Variables and the Propensity for
Yellow Cards
To establish whether bias exists, close exam-
ination of the results in Tables 5–8 is neces-
sary. Table 5 shows the results of the bivariate
probit model for home and away team yellow
cards in the Primera Liga. Starting with the
pregame variables, the coefficient of track is
significantly different from zero for both the
home (p < .1) and away (p < .01) teams. If
a track is present, controlling for other fac-
tors, the probability of the home team receiving
a yellow card increases. In contrast, the prob-
ability of the away team receiving a yellow
card decreases. This can be viewed as evidence
of crowd pressure. The farther the crowd is
from the action, the less inhibited the referee
feels and so the propensity to award the home
team yellow cards increases. Added to this, the
reduced pressure from the crowd manifests itself
in a reduced probability of a yellow card for
the away team. The impact of track on the
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TABLE 5
Bivariate Probit Model for Yellow Cards in Spain’s Primera Ligaa
Home Team Away Team
Independent Variables Coefficient Absolute t Statistic Coefficient Absolute t Statistic
Pregame
Track 0.115∗ (1.91) −0.444∗∗∗ (8.34)
Log attendance 0.019 (0.48) 0.074∗ (1.87)
Derby 0.036 (1.21) −0.007 (0.28)
Difference in bookmaker probability −0.247∗∗∗ (3.12) 0.164∗∗ (2.19)
Difference in bookmaker probability squared −0.103 (0.94) −0.255∗∗ (2.36)
Within-game
Minute 0.011∗∗∗ (8.72) 0.015∗∗∗ (12.49)
Minute squared −0.000013 (1.02) −0.000069∗∗∗ (5.66)
45th minute −0.314∗∗∗ (3.45) −0.344∗∗∗ (4.07)
90th minute −0.768∗∗∗ (7.13) −0.666∗∗∗ (6.49)
Goal difference −0.005 (0.74) −0.004 (0.53)
Goal difference squared −0.022∗∗∗ (6.05) −0.021∗∗∗ (5.91)
Home yellow last 3 min −0.140∗∗∗ (5.09) 0.088∗∗∗ (3.69)
Away yellow last 3 min 0.047∗ (1.94) −0.194∗∗∗ (7.58)
Home yellow prior −0.076∗∗∗ (8.99) 0.017∗∗ (2.18)
Away yellow prior 0.008 (1.07) −0.080∗∗∗ (10.01)
Home second yellow and red 0.005 (0.13) 0.053 (1.64)
Away second yellow and red 0.038 (1.33) 0.001 (0.05)
Constant −2.559∗∗∗ (6.75) −3.009∗∗∗ (7.81)
Home team dummies Yes






Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses.
aGiven the large number of independent variables, the issue of multicollinearity should be addressed. Variance inflation
factors (VIF) for each of the variables in all the regression models are examined. With the exception of minutes and minute
squared which are approximately 18 in all four models, the highest VIF measure is 2.39. All the VIF measures are considerably
below the threshold of 30 that is normally used. Consequently, multicollinearity is not a problem.
∗Significant at .1%; ∗∗significant at .05%; ∗∗∗significant at .01%.
probability of a yellow card in the Champions
League is not significantly different from zero
(see Table 6).1
On this dimension, a bias that is present
in the domestic league (Spain) is not found
in the Champions League, in which neutral
1. Dawson and Dobson (2010) report results from the
Champions League showing that presence of a running track
is associated with greater disciplinary points, taken as a
measure that combines yellow and red cards. This significant
effect becomes zero, however, when they introduce control
variables for what they term “within-game dynamics,” which
include total fouls and total shots during a game. Recall
that a key difference between our analysis and Dawson
and Dobson is that we use minute of game as our unit of
observation and hence we are able to control for events in
games as they occur, thus avoiding the charge of endogeneity
of control variables.
referees are appointed. Hence, the appoint-
ment of neutral referees may well have had a
beneficial effect in terms of reduction of bias.
However, Dawson and Dobson (2010) report
convincing evidence, in the form of significant
referee nationality effects, that country of origin
does induce variation in the disciplinary sanc-
tions awarded by supposedly neutral referees in
the Champions League. These country of ori-
gin data were unavailable to us in the present
study.
The size of the crowd (log attendance) mat-
ters to some extent in both the Primera Liga
and the Champions League. As the size of the
crowd increases, the probability of the away
team receiving a yellow card increases (p value
of estimated coefficient <.10) in the Primera
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TABLE 6
Bivariate Probit Model for Yellow Cards in the Champions League
Home Team Away Team
Independent Variables Coefficient Absolute t Statistic Coefficient Absolute t Statistic
Pregame
Track −0.020 0.17 −0.05 0.47
Log attendance 0.133∗ 1.83 0.126∗ 1.81
Derby 0.063 0.43 0.10 0.70
Difference in bookmaker probability −0.403 1.60 0.24 1.11
Difference in bookmaker probability squared 0.244 0.92 −0.658∗∗∗ 2.66
Group stage −0.005 0.08 −0.07 1.27
Home team qualified from group stage 0.404 1.19 −0.456∗∗ 2.11
Away team qualified from group stage 0.263 1.25 −0.14 0.98
Quarter final 0.054 0.61 −0.04 0.56
Semi final −0.109 0.84 −0.11 0.94
First leg goal difference (second leg home
team—second leg away team)
−0.104∗∗ 2.28 0.01 0.17
Within-game
Minute 0.017∗∗∗ 5.15 0.018∗∗∗ 7.36
Minute squared −0.00010∗∗∗ 3.00 −0.00010∗∗∗ 4.06
45th minute 0.411∗∗∗ 3.82 0.472∗∗∗ 4.99
90th minute 0.212 1.64 −0.027 0.20
Goal difference −0.020 0.77 −0.023 1.32
Goal difference squared 0.010 0.72 −0.002 0.37
Home yellow last 3 min −0.501∗∗∗ 5.89 0.187∗∗∗ 2.84
Away yellow last 3 min 0.122∗ 1.80 −0.451∗∗∗ 6.67
Home yellow prior −0.236∗∗∗ 7.75 0.049∗∗ 2.10
Away yellow prior 0.073∗∗∗ 3.04 −0.212∗∗∗ 9.30
Home second yellow and red −0.020 0.12 0.053 0.69
Away second yellow and red −0.040 0.49 −0.217∗∗ 2.29
Constant 0.017∗∗∗ 5.15 0.018∗∗∗ 7.36
Home team dummies Yes






Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses.
∗Significant at .1%; ∗∗significant at .05%; ∗∗∗significant at .01%.
Liga. However, the probability of home team
yellow card is unaffected by crowd size. In the
Champions League, a larger crowd increases the
probability of the home team receiving a yel-
low card (p < .05). There is a similar, though
now marginally significant, positive effect with
p < .10, of crowd size on probability of the
away team receiving a yellow card. One expla-
nation of this finding is that the crowd are
exerting pressure on the home team players
whose extra efforts result in illegal play pun-
ishable by a yellow card. Larger crowds also
result in higher probability of a yellow card to
away team players. This could be due to crowd
pressure exerted on the referee or it could be
away team player’s response to increased sup-
port for the home team in the form of increased
effort, some of which is illegal in the form of
fouls and other yellow card offences. Our find-
ings on crowd effects are similar to those for
the Champions League reported by Dawson and
Dobson (2010), although we again note that
we have controlled for within-game events as
the match progresses in our minute-by-minute
analysis.
Turning to our control variables, derby has
no noticeable effect on the likelihood of cautions
for either team in either competition. The control
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TABLE 7
Bivariate Probit Model for Second Yellow and Red Cards in Spain’s Primera Liga
Home Team Away Team
Independent variables Coefficient Absolute t Statistic Coefficient Absolute t Statistic
Pregame
Track 0.001 0.02 0.003 0.06
Log attendance 0.071 1.47 0.108∗∗ 2.43
Derby −0.035 0.41 −0.078 0.90
Difference in bookmaker probability −0.042 0.35 −0.055 0.46
Difference in bookmaker probability squared −0.704∗∗ 2.41 −0.429∗ 1.66
Within-game
Minute −0.003 0.73 0.004 0.94
Minute squared 0.000107∗∗∗ 2.72 0.000035 0.88
45th minute −0.114 0.39 −0.251 0.86
90th minute −0.382∗∗ 2.40 −0.276∗ 1.85
Goal difference −0.049∗∗∗ 2.60 0.048∗∗ 2.57
Goal difference squared −0.013 1.36 −0.008 1.13
Home yellow last 3 min 0.328∗∗∗ 5.75 0.091 1.36
Away yellow last 3 min 0.139∗∗ 2.17 0.294∗∗∗ 5.73
Home yellow prior 0.110∗∗∗ 6.18 0.016 0.77
Away yellow prior 0.030 1.55 0.101∗∗∗ 6.13
Home second yellow and red −0.126 1.60 0.074 1.03
Away second yellow and red 0.071 1.18 −0.034 0.62
Constant −4.152∗∗∗ 8.15 −4.516∗∗∗ 9.89
Home team dummies No






Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses.
∗Significant at .1%; ∗∗significant at .05%; ∗∗∗significant at .01%.
variables for team quality, difference in book-
maker probability and its square, largely behave
as expected. The more favored the home team
is in the Primera Liga, the probability of a cau-
tion decreases at a constant rate. For the away
team, the likelihood of a caution increases but
at a decreasing rate. The most likely explanation
is again player response. The more favored the
home team is by the betting public, the more
likely they are to be attacking and are there-
fore less likely to be in receipt of yellow cards.
The away team, conversely, will be defending
and this increases the likelihood of yellow cards
as effort spills over into illegal activity. In the
Champions League, the effect of team quality
influences only the away team’s propensity to
receive a yellow card. The negative relation in
the quadratic of difference in bookmaker prob-
ability suggest that as the home team becomes
more favored to win the match, the likelihood
of a yellow card being shown to the away team
reduces. Given the greater superiority of the
home team, there would seem little point in
engaging in behavior punishable by a yellow
card.
For those pregame variables specific to the
Champions League, of note is the impact of
group stage games in which either the home
or away teams have already qualified for the
knockout stage. When the home teams have
already qualified, the away team is less likely
to be cautioned. The likely explanation is that
there is less incentive on the home team’s part
to be attacking. Home team players are likely to
be cautious as they try to avoid injury or miss
subsequent Champions League matches. Con-
sequently, the away team’s need to defend is
curtailed somewhat and so the probability of
yellow cards to the away team reduces. Another
Champions League specific variable is the score
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TABLE 8
Bivariate Probit Model for Second Yellow and Red Cards in the Champions League
Home Team Away Team
Independent Variables Coefficient Absolute t Statistic Coefficient Absolute t Statistic
Pregame
Track 0.148 1.11 −0.197∗ 1.65
Log attendance −0.106 1.07 −0.026 0.28
Derby 0.021 0.07 −4.480∗∗∗ 20.71
Difference in bookmaker probability 0.907 1.49 −0.181 0.74
Difference in bookmaker probability squared −2.180∗ 1.81 0.130 0.28
Group stage 0.095 0.51 0.103 0.8
Home team qualified from group stage −4.580∗∗∗ 20.41 −4.610∗∗∗ 25.12
Away team qualified from group stage −4.620∗∗∗ 29.51 0.274 0.99
Quarter final 0.035 0.16 0.140 0.7
Semi final 0.203 0.67 0.030 0.09
First leg goal difference −0.169 1.59 0.159∗ 1.84
Within-game
Minute 0.016 1.55 0.002 0.25
Minute squared −0.0000504 0.55 0.0000271 0.31
45th minute 0.799∗∗∗ 3.04 0.505∗ 1.94
90th minute 0.252 0.88 0.144 0.64
Goal difference −0.131∗ 1.95 0.033 0.61
Goal difference squared −0.090∗∗∗ 2.68 −0.014 0.65
Home yellow last 3 min 0.436∗∗ 2.46 0.008 0.05
Away yellow last 3 min −0.146 0.71 0.543∗∗∗ 3.95
Home yellow prior 0.223∗∗∗ 4.30 −0.145∗∗ 2.49
Away yellow prior −0.036 0.73 0.302∗∗∗ 6.65
Home second yellow and red −0.048 0.17 0.139 0.61
Away second yellow and red 0.093 0.34 −0.079 0.65
Constant −2.960∗∗∗ 2.72 −3.310∗∗∗ 3.24
Home team dummies No






Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses.
∗Significant at .1%; ∗∗significant at .05%; ∗∗∗significant at .01%.
line from the first leg in the knockout phase of
the competition. In instances where the home
team has a positive score line from the first
leg, the greater this score line, the less likely
it is to receive a yellow card. For the home
teams, the benefits of home advantage and a
lead on aggregate diminishes the need for play-
ing strategies that are likely to result in yel-
low cards. In the case of the away team, the
score line from the first leg has no significant
effect.
Among the pregame variables, we find some
evidence of home advantage and refereeing bias
in the form of track in the Primera Liga.
The effects captured by log attendance in the
Champions League cannot be conclusively put
down to referee bias and are likely to be partly
due to behavioral responses on the part of play-
ers. The focus of the following section is on
within-game variables and the effect on the like-
lihood of yellow cards in both the Primera Liga
and the Champions League.
B. Within-Game Variables and Yellow Cards
Minute and its square are control variables.
Their effects are somewhat consistent across the
two competitions and teams. As the match pro-
gresses, the likelihood of a yellow card increases
but at a diminishing rate, with the exception
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of the home team in the Primera Liga where
the likelihood of a yellow card increases at a
constant rate. In the Primera Liga, teams are
less likely to receive a caution in the 45th
minute, 90th minute, and any extra time at the
end of each half. Conversely, in the Champions
League, both teams are likely to be cautioned
during the 45th minute and first half injury time.
However, this only marginally applies to the
home team at the end of the second half. This
would suggest that, controlling for other factors,
players’ behaviors with respect to cautions are
dependent on the stage reached in the match.
The state of the match with respect to score
line matters in the Primera Liga. For every addi-
tional goal by which the home team leads, the
likelihood of a card reduces at an increasing rate
for both teams. This is a matter of incentives.
As the game becomes further out of reach for
the away team, there is little point in players of
either team engaging in foul play. The contrast
is also true in that for every additional goal the
home team finds itself behind, the likelihood of
a caution decreases for either team. The effect
of score line in the Champions League on the
probability of a card being awarded is not signif-
icantly different from 0. The likely explanation
is the complexity of the competition’s struc-
ture, which includes the group phase, as well
as knockout phase, first and second legs, and
the importance of away goals. Consequently, the
score line is not absolute but relative to a set of
factors.
The history of sanctions within the game
prior to the subject minute is a determinant of
whether teams are likely to be awarded a yellow
card. In both the Primera Liga and Champions
League, if the home team had received a yel-
low card in the last 3 minutes, the likelihood of
receiving a yellow card is reduced (p < .01 in
both cases). Interesting is that for both competi-
tions, the likelihood of the away team receiving
a card increases (p < .01 in both models). This
may be reflecting an evening-out of sanctions
by the referee. It could also be capturing retal-
iatory behavior on the part of the away team. In
the case of the former, this is an indication of
home advantage and bias. However, it is not
possible to separate out home advantage and
bias from retaliation. If the away team has been
awarded a card in the previous 3 minutes, this
increases the likelihood of the home team being
awarded a card and reduces the likelihood of the
away team being awarded a card in both com-
petitions. These results are replicated for yellow
cards awarded to the home team prior to the last
3 minutes; in both competitions, they reduce the
home team’s likelihood of receiving a yellow
card while increasing that of the away team’s.
The impact of dismissals is limited to away team
in the Champions League. If the away team suf-
fers a dismissal earlier during the match, the
likelihood of receiving a yellow card reduces.
The history of sanctions during the match clearly
has the dual role of influencing player and ref-
eree behavior to the point that refereeing bias
cannot be rejected.
C. Dismissals in Primera Liga and Champions
League
For dismissal, we turn attention to Tables 7
and 8. The impact of track is different from the
effects noted on the likelihood of yellow cards.
There is no significant effect on home or away
teams’ likelihood of dismissals in Primera Liga.
The same finding applies to home team like-
lihood of dismissal in the Champions League.
However, for the Champions League, the pres-
ence of a running track reduces the likeli-
hood of a dismissal for the away team, albeit
with marginal significance (p < .10). Again,
this shows the effect of crowd pressure and its
manifestation in home advantage and refereeing
bias.
The size of the crowd (log attendance)
increases the likelihood of a dismissal for the
away team in Primera Liga (p < .05) but has
no discernable effect on either home or away
team in the Champions League. Causality could
be running from crowd to players in which case,
there is no bias. It could be that the increased
crowd is inducing more attacking play from the
home team players which then results in foul
play on the part of away team players which
is then followed by dismissal. Alternatively, it
could be that the crowd is able to influence the
behavior of the referee in the award of a red
card. In this case, it is not possible to distin-
guish between players’ behavioral response and
referee bias. Another possibility is that UEFA’s
policy of neutral referees ensures that ref-
eree policy toward dismissals is independent of
crowd size (so referees are not at all responsive
to social pressure on this dimension). In con-
trast, faced with larger crowds in Spain, referees
tend to exhibit a greater propensity to award red
cards to away teams, over and above the effects
captured by pregame and within-game control
variables.
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For derby matches, a significant impact is
noted only in the Champions League. The proba-
bility of the away team player being dismissed is
reduced for matches of local rivalry. The effect
of difference in bookmaker probability is also
significant. As difference in bookmaker prob-
ability increases, so that bookmakers’ assess-
ment is of a less close contest, ex ante, the
likelihood of home team dismissals declines
for Primera Liga matches, (p < .05). A simi-
lar effect is noted in the Champions League but
with a lower degree of significance (p < .1 for
difference in bookmaker probability squared ).
Further, for Champions League group phase
matches, whether the home or away teams have
qualified for the knockout phase is significant
and influences the behavior of the teams as
to be expected, except for the effect of away
team qualified from group stage on away team
dismissal. The status of the contests also mat-
ters in the knockout phase of the Champi-
ons League. If the home team has an advan-
tage from the first leg, the away team has
a greater likelihood of receiving a red card
(p < .1).
With respect to within-game control vari-
ables, minute squared is significant and posi-
tive showing that home team players are more
likely to be dismissed, increasingly, as the match
draws to a close. For both teams’ players, the
likelihood of dismissal increases in the 45th
minute which includes first half injury time in
the Champions League. The effects of injury
time at the end of the second half is only notice-
able in the Primera Liga in which players of both
teams are less likely to be dismissed.
As goal difference increases, the home team
is less likely to suffer a dismissal in both compe-
titions. For the away team in the Primera Liga,
players are likely to be shown a second yellow
or red card. This applies only to the likelihood
of a dismissal for the away team in the Primera
Liga. However, no effect is noted for the likeli-
hood of away team dismissal in the Champions
League.
With respect to cards, dismissal of the home
team players are influenced by yellow cards to
the home teams in the preceding 3 minutes in
both competitions. If the away team has been
awarded a card in the last 3 minutes, the home
and away teams are likely to have a player dis-
missed in the Primera Liga. This only applies
to the away team in the Champions League. For
yellow cards awarded to the home team prior
to the last 3 minutes, this again increases the
likelihood of dismissal to the home team in both
competitions. Contrastingly, the probability of a
dismissal for the away team in the Champions
League falls. As expected, yellow cards awarded
to the away team prior to the last 3 minutes
are likely to result in dismissals for the away
team. Taken overall, the role of cards awarded
during the match have the expected effects on
dismissals.
For dismissals in both competitions, the
extent of home advantage and referee bias is not
as high compared with those noted in the case of
yellow cards. One reason for this is that the con-
sequences of dismissal are serious and are likely
to have a dramatic effect on the match compared
with the issue of a caution. However, this is not
to suggest that there is no evidence of referee
bias in dismissing players; the effects reported
through the variables track, in the Champions
League, are indicative of bias.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we test for, and find evidence
of, referee bias in favor of home teams in Euro-
pean football. The context for the analysis is
Spain’s Primera Liga and the UEFA Champions
League. As with Buraimo, Forrest, and Sim-
mons (2010), we adopt an analytical approach
in which match minute is the unit of observa-
tion. By using minute as the unit of observation,
we are able to control for a set of covariates
capturing pregame information and for a set of
control variables representing events that unfold
during the course of the match. The results of
the analysis show that pregame and within-game
information both contribute to referee behavior
in terms of likelihood of awarding a card in a
given minute.
In Primera Liga matches where the crowd
is separated from the pitch by running tracks,
we find that the probability of the award of a
yellow card to the home is higher and that of
the away team is lower compared to matches
played at stadia without running tracks. This
finding is similar to that of Buraimo, Forrest,
and Simmons (2010) for England and Germany.
Our additional evidence on running track effects
in Spain gives greater force to the charge of
refereeing bias created by social pressure. In
the Champions League the probability of an
away team player being dismissed is reduced in
the presence of a running track, which is again
indicative of referee bias.
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Referee behavior is also influenced by the
size of the crowd in attendance. Although we
have no evidence on the composition of the
crowd, stadium attendance can be used as a
proxy for home team support. We find that
the greater the crowd size, the more likely the
away team is to be awarded a yellow card in
the Primera Liga. This provides evidence that
the crowd, and more specifically its size, is
able to exert enough social pressure on offi-
cials to the extent that decisions favor the home
team.
Cautions are more likely to be given to away
team players, in both competitions, if the home
team has received one in the previous 3 minutes;
the likelihood of the home team receiving a
card is reduced under the same circumstances.
Similarly, cautions to the away team influence
how cautions are awarded to the home and away
team and the presence of bias cannot be ruled
out. In some instances, it is difficult to separate
referee bias from player behavior. For instance,
the increased probability of a yellow card to
the away team following a card to the home
team may be a result of retaliation from away
team players rather than bias. However, bias
cannot be ruled out given the collective evidence
emerging from the impact of track and crowd
size.
The Primera Liga relies on referees drawn
from the domestic market. In contrast, UEFA is
able to draw on the best referees across major
European leagues for its prestigious Champi-
ons League competition. In light of this, one
would have expected the degree of refereeing
bias to be less evident in the Champions League
than in the Primera Liga. On this, we have con-
flicting evidence. On the one hand, the positive
impact of track presence on propensity to award
home yellow cards that is present in Spain does
not carry over into the European competition
with neutral referees. However, for red cards,
we find that the likelihood of player dismissal
is lower in the presence of the track, suggest-
ing that some bias against away teams does
remain.
Europe’s premier competition is subject to
similar significant impacts of social pressure
through crowd size as in the domestic competi-
tion, specifically in relation to a positive effect
on the award of yellow cards to visiting teams.
Interestingly, in the Champions League, we find
a significant positive effect of crowd size on
probability of award of a home team yellow card
that was not present in the domestic competition.
This suggests a contrarian approach by referees
in response to crowd pressure, where they over-
compensate by means of a higher probability of
award of a yellow card to the home team. More
reassuringly, from UEFA’s perspective, signif-
icant crowd effects on probability of red card
to either team are not revealed in the Champi-
ons League.
Overall, we have some partial grounds for
optimism to UEFA on the effectiveness of its
policy of appointing neutral referees. However,
our findings from the Champions League on the
response of probability of away team red card
to presence of running track and on the response
of probability of home team yellow card to
crowd size suggest that elements of bias do per-
sist, despite the appointment of neutral referees.
Further research on these questions is needed.
One important extension will be to examine the
incentives for referee performance in terms of
remuneration in different competitions and also
the career implications of good performance in
the Champions League and domestic competi-
tions (Bryson, Buraimo, and Simmons 2011).
Another useful extension would be to model
the subjective ratings of refereeing perfor-
mance as provided by newspapers and specialist
football magazines (Frick, Gu¨rtler, and Prinz
2008).
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